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THE DODD-FRANK ACT: TARP BAILOUT
BACKLASH AND TOO BIG TO FAIL
LISSA LAMKIN BROOME*
I. INTRODUCTION
In the pages of this journal two years ago, I wrote about
"Extraordinary Government Intervention to Bolster Bank
Balance Sheets."' One component of this intervention was the
Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) created by the
Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008.2 Although TARP
may have saved the United States economy from a lengthy
depression, it was perceived by many as a "bailout" of the banks
whose own greed had precipitated the financial crisis. A number of
institutions received TARP funds, but two - Citigroup and Bank
of America - were identified as "systemically significant" and
received additional equity infusions and other extraordinary aid
from the government. As I noted then, "systemically significant"
had become a "thinly veiled code-name for institutions that are
'too big to fail."' There were significant concerns that the
government's intervention created moral hazard and that risk-
taking of financial institutions would remain unchecked if the
market believed that the government would intervene if necessary
to prevent the failure of the largest financial institutions.
On July 21, 2010, President Obama signed the massive
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of
.Wachovia Professor of Banking Law; Director, Center for Banking and Finance,
University of North Carolina School of Law. Thanks to Brian Choi, UNC School of
Law Class of 2010, for his helpful research assistance with this article.
1. Lissa L. Broome, Extraordinary Government Intervention to Bolster Bank
Balance Sheets, 13 N.C. BANKING INST. 137 (2009) [hereinafter Extraordinary
Intervention]. See also Lissa L. Broome, Government Investment in Banks: Creeping
Nationalization or Prudent, Temporary Aid?, 4 FIU L. REV. 409 (2009) [hereinafter
Government Investment].
2. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 § 101, 12 U.S.C.A. § 5211
(West 2009).
3. Broome, Extraordinary Intervention, supra note 1, at 153.
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2010 (Dodd-Frank). 4 This essay will describe how Dodd-Frank
responds to TARP and attempts to change the phrase "too big to
fail" to "too big, will fail." The centerpiece of Dodd-Frank is the
creation of the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) as
the new systemic risk regulator, with the authority to identify
systemically significant institutions, subject them to additional
prudential regulation by the Federal Reserve Board, and to
mandate an orderly liquidation without the possibility of
reorganization in the event they are not able to remain solvent on
their own. Whether this new regime will ever be used and whether
it will incentivize bank and nonbank financial institutions to
reduce their size and complexity so they will not become subject to
it, of course, remain to be seen.
II. OVERVIEW OF TARP
After the numerous financial calamities of September
2008,' Congress enacted the Emergency Economic Stabilization
Act of 2008 (EESA) on October 3, 2008.6 A centerpiece of EESA
was the authorization of up to $700 billion to fund TARP. What
often gets lost in this very large number is that only $245 billion of
this sum (still a huge number) was actually used for government
investments in the preferred stock of banks and bank holding
companies. Of that $245 billion, $204.9 billion was expended to
4. Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (to be codified in scattered sections
of U.S.C.).
5. During September 2008, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were placed in
government conservatorship, Merrill Lynch was taken over by Bank of America,
Lehman Brothers entered bankruptcy with the Fed declining to provide it assistance
similar to that extended to assist JP Morgan Chase in a takeover of Bear Stearns the
prior spring, AIG was taken over by the government, the net asset value of the
money market mutual fund Reserve Primary Fund fell below $1 per share, and the
government contemplated providing assistance to Citigroup to purchase Wachovia
bank - the fourth largest banking institution in the U.S. at the time - as it bordered
on insolvency. See Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, The Financial Crisis: A
Timeline of Events and Policy Actions, http://timeline.stlouisfed.org/ (last visited Feb.
7, 2011).
6. Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122 Stat. 3767 (2008) (to be codified in scattered sections
of U.S.C.).
7. Of the $700 billion initially authorized by Congress for this program, only
$474.8 billion had been obligated as of October 3, 2010, and no further obligations
could be incurred with TARP funds after the two-year anniversary of EESA.
SIGTARP, QUARTERLY REPORT TO CONGRESS 43 (Oct. 26, 2010)[hereinafter
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buy preferred stock in banks under the Capital Purchase Program
(CPP).' The Treasury determined that the maximum that could be
invested in any one institution under the CPP would be $25
billion.! Nine of the largest financial institutions received the lion's
share of the initial CPP funds, $125 billion, 0 even though Jamie
Dimon, the CEO of one of those recipients - JPMorgan Chase -
was reported to say, "we didn't ask for it, didn't want it, and didn't
need it."" Nevertheless, government authorities wanted the
largest institutions to participate in the program so that there
would be no stigma attached to accepting the funds for the banks
that did need the additional capital to maintain solvency and
liquidity.12
It didn't take long, however, for Citigroup to find itself in
need of additional equity. On November 23, 2008, Citigroup was
granted an additional $20 billion in funding under the newly
created Targeted Investment Program (TIP). This "program" had
one participant until Citigroup was joined by Bank of America on
January 16, 2009. Bank of America also received an additional $20
billion to assist it with unexpected losses resulting from its
acquisition of Merrill Lynch." The government's total investment
in each institution of $45 billion gave it a very significant
ownership percentage in each.14
SIGTARP ]. Of the $475 billion, $250 billion was the maximum allocated to
investments in bank capital, with $245 billion of that sum actually spent. OFFICE OF
FINANCIAL STABILITY, TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF PROGRAM: TWO YEAR
RETROSPECTIVE i (Oct. 2010) [hereinafter OFFICE OF FINANCIAL STABILITY].
8. SIGTARP, supra note 7.
9. U.S. TREAS. DEPT., PROGRAM DESCRIPTIONS, CAPITAL PURCHASE PROGRAM
1-2 (Jan. 2009).
10. Citigroup ($25 billion), JPMorgan Chase & Co. ($25 billion), Wells Fargo &
Company ($25 billion), Bank of America Corporation ($15 billion plus $10 billion
from Merrill Lynch), The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. ($10 billion), Morgan Stanley
($10 billion), The Bank of New York Mellon Corporation ($3 billion), State Street
Corporation ($2 billion). U.S. TREAS. DEPT., TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF PROGRAM
(TARP) MONTHLY 105(a) - REPORT - DECEMBER 2010 App. 2 (Jan. 2011).
11. Interview by Erin Burnett, CNBC Street Signs, with Jamie Dimon, Chairman
and CEO, JPMorgan Chase (Dec. 11, 2008).
12. Mike Ferullo, Credit Markets: Industry Group, Lawmakers Welcome Treasury
Plan to Purchase Equity in Banks, 91 BNA BANKING REP. 644 (Oct. 20, 2008).
13. See Extraordinary Intervention, supra note 1, at 142.
14. Id. at 153-54.
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TARP recipients were not required to use TARP funds for
any particular purpose, although many hoped that the additional
capital would be used by the recipients to support new lending that
would help ease the credit crunch which had stalled the economy.
Some TARP recipients found the conditions attached to TARP
funding to be onerous, leading them to seek to repay the
government as soon as feasible. These conditions included
quarterly dividend payments to the government of five percent per
year (with the TIP dividend at eight percent per year), dividends
that could be paid to common stockholders limited to one cent per
quarter, and restrictions on executive compensation. The latter
restriction seemingly provided the most powerful incentive to get
out from under the TARP funding regime. As a result, as of
September 30, 2010, $192 billion of the $245 billion in TARP bank
stock investments, or 78% of the total, had been repaid." This
includes the Citigroup and Bank of America CPP and TIP
preferred stock, along with the CPP stock in the remaining six of
those nine large financial institutions. A few of the smaller
institutions receiving TARP investments have failed, but it is
hoped that the remainder of the outstanding investments will be
repaid in the future. Moreover, as of September 30, 2010, the
government earned some $26.8 billion in income from its TARP
investments through the dividends it received as a preferred
stockholder and on the sale of warrants that it was granted by the
TARP recipients at the time of the initial preferred stock
investment.16
The TARP program has been remarkably successful, in
terms of cost to the government and in its goal to help stabilize the
financial system. 7 The largest financial institutions did not fail.
Citigroup and Bank of America survived. Wachovia might exist as
15. OFFICE OF FINANCIAL STABILITY, supra note 7, at i.
16. Id.
17. Steven Rattner, How an Unloved Bail-out Saved America, FIN. TIMEs, Oct. 3,
2010 ("But instead of euthanising Tarp [sic] we should be eulogizing it as, without
exaggeration, this legislation did more to keep America's financial system - and
therefore its economy - functioning than any passed since the 1930s."); Kera Ritter,
Bank Bailout Seen to Benefit Big Banks More than Small Ones; $49 Billion Unpaid,
96 BNA BANKING REP. 132 (Jan. 21, 2011) ("Banking organizations, Treasury
officials and the Office of the Special Inspector General for TARP agree that CPP
and other components of TARP averted a financial collapse.").
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an independent institution today if its liquidity crisis had occurred
after the passage of EESA instead of before. Ironically,
Wachovia's purchase by Wells Fargo was announced the same day
that EESA was enacted, but this followed a week of turmoil in
which Wachovia was almost sold to Citigroup with FDIC
assistance.
Notwithstanding the relatively low losses to the
government and the rapid payback of TARP funds, there is serious
concern about the moral hazard created by TARP. As discussed
in a report on Citigroup by the Office of the Special Inspector
General for TARP (SIGTARP), when the government "assured
the world in 2008 that it would not let Citigroup fail, it did more
than reassure troubled markets - it encouraged high-risk behavior
by insulating risk-takers from the consequence of failure." 9 As
Professor Art Wilmarth of George Washington University Law
School observed, the "explicit and implicit public subsidies . . .
undermine market discipline and distort economic incentives" for
the institutions that receive them.20
III. THE DODD-FRANK ACT AND Too BIG To FAIL
Dodd-Frank addressed the financial crisis and its fallout on
a number of fronts. A centerpiece of Dodd-Frank was the
creation of the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC or
Council), to serve as a systemic risk regulator. 21 Dodd-Frank does
not continue TARP, and instead consciously adopted numerous
provisions indicating that systemically significant bank and
nonbank financial companies would be subject to stringent
regulation and subject to liquidation if unable to maintain their
18. See RICK ROTHACKER, BANKTOWN: THE RISE AND STRUGGLES OF
CHARLOTTE'S BIG BANKS 123-26 (2010) (discussing the sale of Wachovia).
19. SIGTARP, EXTRAORDINARY FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE PROVIDED TO
CITIGROUP, INC.: SUMMARY OF REPORT: SIGTARP-11-002 (Jan. 2011).
20. Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Dodd-Frank Act: A Flawed and Inadequate
Response to the Too-Big-To-Fail Problem, 89 OR. L. REV. - (forthcoming 2011).
21. Dodd-Frank Act § 111 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5321 and 5 U.S.C. §
5314). The voting members of the FSOC, headed by the Secretary of the Treasury,
include the heads of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, OCC,
FDIC, NCUA, SEC, CFTC, Federal Housing Finance Agency, the new Bureau of
Consumer Financial Protection, and an independent member appointed by the
President and knowledgeable about insurance. Id.
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solvency. The tough measures are an obvious reaction to the
concerns about the moral hazard created by TARP and other
government measures used to diminish the harsh effects of the
financial crisis on the economy.
A. TARP Measures
The total amount of TARP funds authorized under the
EESA was reduced by Dodd-Frank from $700 billion to $475
billion.22 Furthermore, Dodd-Frank provides that no new TARP
programs may be established, and that any money repaid may not
be reused to fund additional TARP expenditures under existing
TARP programs.23
Although Dodd-Frank purposely does not provide any
TARP-like structure for government investment in bank equity
during difficult financial times, it does require the FSOC to
conduct a study about the "feasibility, benefits, costs, and structure
of a contingent capital requirement" for the systemically
significant bank holding companies and nonbank financial
companies identified by the FSOC.24 If contingent capital bonds
were required to be issued by these largest institutions and could
be converted to equity capital in times of financial stress, then the
capital markets could provide equity, rather than the government
stepping in as in TARP. Further, the pricing of the contingent
capital bond would provide the market's measure of the riskiness
of each institution's activities, with those viewed the riskiest (and
most likely to require conversion in times of financial stress),
priced the highest. It is possible, however, that the price of such
contingent capital would be so high,2 because of the possibility of
conversion to equity and loss of the creditor's priority claim in a
22. Id. § 1302 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5225). By the terms of EESA, TARP
funds not committed on October 3, 2010, could not be allocated further, so this
provision reinforced the existing TARP commitment level of $475 billion.
23. Id.
24. Id. § 115(c) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5325).
25. Wilmarth, supra note 20 (institutional investors are likely to demand a
"comparatively high yield and other investor-friendly features that may not be
acceptable to" the systemically significant institutions that might be required to issue
contingent capital).
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liquidation, that institutions would break themselves into smaller
pieces so as not to be within the systemically significant group of
institutions subject to this requirement.
Subsequent to Dodd-Frank, Congress enacted the Small
Business Jobs Act of 2010 (SBJA).26 The SBJA established a $30
billion Small Business Lending Fund (SBLF) and itself provides
for government equity investment in small banks. The SBJA has
been dubbed "Son of TARP" by some. The SBLF provides
capital to each bank and takes an ownership interest in the bank,
but the dividend amounts and repayment plans are determined on
a bank-by-bank basis. A bank with less than $10 billion in assets
would be subject to an initial dividend payment to the government
of five percent, but this rate could be reduced to as low as one
percent depending on how much the bank increased its small
business lending after receiving the government's equity
investment. The SBLF provides a clear incentive to a bank to
make the loans that the government wishes to encourage, in
contrast to TARP which was premised on the idea that increased
capital would naturally result in increased credit, but did not have
any specific requirement that the capital be used to support new
loans. In addition, the SBJA provides a disincentive for not
lending by increasing the dividend rate payable to the government
if the government's capital infusion has not increased the bank's
small business lending in the first two and one-half years after the
government's equity investment. If no small business lending
improvement is shown thereafter, the dividend rate may increase
to nine percent. Those banks currently enrolled in TARP may
switch to the SBJA program in an effort to lower the dividend
payment rate.27 The focus of the SBLF is on small banks since
smaller banks - those with less than $1 billion in assets - hold forty
percent of all outstanding small business loans, although only
twelve percent of all bank assets.28
26. See The Small Business Jobs Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-240, 124 Stat. 2504
(to be codified in scattered sections of U.S.C.).
27. Banks that have missed a TARP dividend payment to the government are not
eligible for the SBLF.
28. Rob Cox & Rolfe Winkler, Smaller Banks Don't Need $30 Billion From U.S.,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 2010, at B2.
2011] 75
NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE
B. Too Big to Fail Countermeasures
Dodd-Frank responded to concerns about the bailout of
too big to fail financial institutions during the financial crisis in
part by creating the FSOC. Dodd-Frank provides that the
Purposes of the Council are -
(A) to identify risks to the financial stability of the
United States that could arise from the material
financial distress or failure, or ongoing activities, of
large, interconnected bank holding companies or
nonbank financial companies, or that could arise
outside the financial services marketplace;
(B) to promote market discipline, by eliminating
expectations on the part of shareholders, creditors,
and counterparties of such companies that the
Government will shield them from losses in the
event of failure; and
(C) to respond to emerging threats to the stability of
the United States financial system.29
The large, interconnected bank holding companies whose
risks the FSOC must identify, include bank holding companies
with greater than $50 billion in consolidated assets, although the
Board of Governors may, upon a recommendation of the FSOC,
increase the asset size above $50 billion.30 The Council must also
identify systemically significant nonbank financial companies; once
designated, the Fed will for the first time have supervision of and
regulatory authority over these companies. A company will be
considered a "financial company" if eighty-five percent of its
consolidated assets or revenues come from "financial in nature"
activities as specified in the Bank Holding Company Act.32
29. Dodd-Frank Act § 112 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5322).
30. Id. § 115(a) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5325). As of June 30, 2010,
approximately 25 domestic bank holding companies had assets exceeding $50 billion.
Banks and Thrifts with Most Assets, AM. BANKER, Nov. 18, 2010,
http://www.americanbanker.com/rankings/bt-most-assets-1028909-1.html.
31. Dodd-Frank Act § 113 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5323).
32. Id. § 101 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5311).
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Presumably, if this authority had been in place prior to the
financial crisis, Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, AIG, and the
largest bank holding companies, such as Bank of America,
Citigroup, JP Morgan Chase, and Wachovia, among others, would
have been identified as systemically significant.
Systemically significant institutions are subject to more
stringent capital, leverage, and liquidity requirements as to be
recommended by the Council and developed by regulation by the
Fed." Of most relevance to this discussion, however, is how Dodd-
Frank directs such institutions to be treated in the event they seem
headed towards failure. These "systemic" institutions are the ones
that have been thought of as "too big to fail," but Dodd-Frank
turns this assumption on its head and seems determined to allow
the institutions to fail and be handled through an orderly
liquidation process. To assist in planning for a systemic
institution's demise, the institution must prepare and submit to the
Fed a so-called "resolution plan," otherwise dubbed a "living will"
to instruct the FDIC as receiver how to resolve and unwind the
institution's various exposures. 4 If the institution poses a "grave
threat" to the financial stability of the United States, as a "last
resort" the FSOC may order the institution to divest some of its
holdings, presumably making the institution less systemically
significant if it has been broken up into separate pieces. If the
institution is still unable to retain solvency, then the FSOC may
recommend that instead of a bankruptcy procedure, the institution
be subject to an "orderly liquidation authority."3 6  The FDIC
would serve as the institution's receiver, even for nonbank
institutions." Its mandate is to liquidate the institution, without
the possibility of reorganization.
Any costs associated with the insolvency would be funded
by FDIC borrowing from the Treasury.39 This debt would be
33. Id. § 115 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5325).
34. Id. §165 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5365).
35. Id. § 121 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5331).
36. Id. § 204 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5384).
37. The SIPC would act as trustee for an orderly liquidation of a broker-dealer.
Id. at § 205 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5385).
38. Id. § 204 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5384).
39. Id. § 201(n)(5) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5384).
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repaid by the assets of the liquidated institution. In the event
these funds are not sufficient to reimburse the Treasury, then all
other systemically significant institutions would be assessed their
share of the cost of the resolution.4" The potential for funding
losses associated with another systemic institution's demise might
be an incentive to bank holding companies to reduce their
consolidated assets below the $50 billion threshold and to nonbank
financial companies to voluntarily divide their multiple business
lines into separate entities so that no one of them is considered to
be systemically significant and subject to the FDIC's orderly
liquidation authority.4 1 Indeed, one might suggest to those
financial institutions that became bank holding companies during
the financial crisis to have access to TARP funds and the investor
comfort of the Fed as an involved regulator, that they should undo
the bank holding company label. Congress, however, was one step
ahead and inserted a "Hotel California" provision that states that
if an institution had $50 billion in assets or more, was a bank
holding company on January 1, 2010, and if it had received TARP
funds, it may cease to be a BHC, but it will continue to be
regulated as one.42
Dodd-Frank also enacted two provisions to prevent
systemically significant institutions from receiving other special
treatment that might manifest the government's decision that they
indeed are too big to fail. First, the Fed's emergency lending
authority, Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act, was revised.43
During the financial crisis, this authority had been used as the
basis for a number of the Fed's broad-based credit and liquidity
programs, but also as the vehicle to justify credit extended to assist
JPMorgan Chase in its acquisition of Bear Stearns, and to provide
extraordinary loans to AIG. Dodd-Frank limits the Fed's
40. Id. at §§ 204, 210, 214 (to be codified in scattered sections of U.S.C.).
41. See Wilmarth, supra note 20 (criticizing this ex post funding mechanism in
part because it does not require systemically significant institutions to internalize the
costs of their own risk-taking activities).
42. Dodd-Frank Act § 117 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5327). The "Hotel
California" reference is to an Eagles song by the same name with the lyric, "You may
check out any time you like, but you can never leave." THE EAGLES, HOTEL
CALIFORNIA (Asylum Records 1977). So too, new BHCs may cease to have that
status, but they cannot leave the regulatory apparatus that applies to BHCs.
43. Dodd-Frank Act, § 1101 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C § 343).
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emergency lending authority to permit assistance only to a
"participant in any program or facility with broad-based
eligibility."" Second, the Act amended the systemic risk exception
to the requirement that the FDIC use the "least cost method of
resolution" for an insolvent depository institution.45 This language
was used first by the FDIC to justify aid to Citigroup for the
potential acquisition of Wachovia, although ultimately Wells
Fargo won Wachovia's hand in a bid without government
assistance. The FDIC also used the systemic risk authority to
support its broad-based guarantee programs for bank deposits and
other liabilities that benefited all banks, not just those nearing
insolvency. Dodd-Frank responded to those who criticized this as
an improper use of the systemic risk exception" and provided a
new statutory scheme that specifically authorizes the use of such
broad measures during times of severe economic distress, rather
than including these programs within the systemic risk exception.47
As Professor Wilmarth notes, the FDIC's systemic risk exception
and the Federal Reserve's section 13(3) authority to provide
emergency assistance under a highly selective "program" are still
available to bail out creditors of failing systemically significant
institutions."
Finally, Dodd-Frank introduced a liability concentration
limit for "financial companies" that includes bank holding
companies and the systemically significant nonbank financial
companies identified by the FSOC. These entities may not capture
more than ten percent of the consolidated liabilities of all such
entities via any merger or combination.49 The FSOC is required to
prepare a study regarding how this concentration limit will affect
financial stability, moral hazard, efficiency, and competitiveness of
U.S. financial firms, and the cost and availability of credit."o The
44. Id. (emphasis added).
45. Id. at §1105 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5612). The FDIC's systemic risk
exception to the least cost resolution for an insolvent depository institution is at 12
U.S.C. § 1823(c)(4)(G).
46. See Extraordinary Intervention, supra note 1.
47. Dodd-Frank Act § 1105 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5612).
48. Wilmarth, supra note 20.
49. Dodd-Frank Act, sec. 622, § 14 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. §1852).
50. Id.
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FSOC may then make recommendations regarding modification of
the liability cap." For this reason, Professor Wilmarth is worried
that the FSOC will succumb to pressure to "weaken or remove"
the liability cap.52 This provision will complement the ten percent
nationwide deposit cap introduced by Riegle-Neal for bank
acquisitions" by adding a new size cap that will relate to
combinations between financial companies and between banks and
other financial companies.
IV. CONCLUSION
Dodd-Frank represents a multi-faceted effort to tackle the
problem of financial institutions that may grow so big that their
failure would lead to a systemic risk to our financial system. The
impetus for these changes was the public's backlash to the TARP
bailout and the moral hazard that it created. Financial institutions
that do not bear the full costs of their risky activities have no
incentive to reduce or alleviate that risk. Dodd-Frank attempts to
reverse that moral hazard by clearly providing that these
institutions are subject to additional oversight, must provide
resolution plans, are subject to asset divestiture, and in the event
their failure may still not be prevented must be liquidated without
the possibility of reorganization. Moreover, large, systemically
significant financial institutions may be stuck with the costs
associated with the failure of other systemically significant
institutions even if they are not themselves engaging in
inappropriate or excessively risky activities. Large institutions will
also have a hard cap on how large they may grow through
acquisition (rather than internal growth) through the liability
concentration provision.
It remains to be seen, however, whether the FSOC will
have the political will and foresight to identify the systemically
significant nonbank financial institutions, to hold to the $50 billion
asset threshold for systemically significant bank holding
companies, and whether and under what circumstances the FDIC
51. 12 U.S.C. § 1852.
52. Wilmarth, supra note 20.
53. 12 U.S.C. § 1842(d)(2).
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will exercise the orderly liquidation authority rather than opt for a
Chapter 11 reorganization. Dodd-Frank provides a framework for
ending too big to fail if the regulators have the will.5 4
54. Ron Feldman, Senior Vice President for Supervision, Regulation and Credit
at the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis asserts that "if Dodd-Frank is
implemented effectively, large financial companies will voluntarily choose to
downsize because their funding costs will increase as creditors realize they will not be
protected in a failure." Barbara A. Rehm, Strange But True: Dodd-Frank May
Actually End TBTF, AM. BANKER, Oct. 21, 2010,
http://www.americanbanker.comlissues/175_202/dodd-frank-too-big-to-fail-1027404-
1.html.
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